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War and peace
This article is published in partnership with Dialogues économiques, produced by Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE).
With more than 5.4 million deaths, the Second Congo War, which began in 1998, is widely regarded as one of the deadliest conflicts since the Second World War. Although the Pretoria Agreement formally ended it in 2003, the violence continued in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): indeed, in the country’s north-eastern province of Kivu, armed confrontations have lasted more than two decades.
Such struggles starkly illustrate the political and ethnic dimensions of the violence. The region’s abundant mineral wealth, particularly in coltan1, has fuelled intense competition. Yet Kivu is also home to multiple ethnic communities, including the Nande, Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi), Nyanga, Hunde and Tembo peoples.
Since Congo’s independence in 1960, the region has been marked by instability and recurrent ethnic tensions, with the proliferation of armed actors and local militias turning Kivu into a powder keg – where violence unfolds both between and within ethnic groups.
Identity and internal divisions
Economic research has long demonstrated that ethnic identities tend to intensify during periods of conflict, and this debate is deeply rooted in Africa’s colonial history. Border-making, colonial administration and selective support for particular communities contributed to the institutionalisation of ethnic divisions.
The idea – perhaps counterintuitive – that war can strengthen social cohesion and ethnic identity motivated Matteo Sestito’s study of ethnic conflict and intra-group cooperation across Africa from 2002 to 20152.
Identifying the ethnic factor
To investigate this phenomenon, Sestito faced a major methodological challenge: geolocated conflict intelligence from the database of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED)3 does not make it possible to determine whether a conflict is ethnic in nature. Violence can involve state forces, rebel groups, militias, or protests without necessarily being ethnic; it may instead stem from territorial, religious, or political disputes.
In the absence of comprehensive information on ethnic conflict, most existing studies have focused on localised case studies. Sestito assembled a new database comprising more than 1,900 armed groups operating across 36 African states, covering approximately 60 per cent of the continent’s land area.
To identify conflicts with an ethnic dimension, the researcher cross-referenced this data with a broad range of sources, including academic literature, reports from international and non-governmental organisations, and press coverage. This allowed him to find out which groups recruited, fought, or mobilised in the name of ethnic identity.
Measuring cohesion
Such an undertaking requires careful handling, since armed groups can have overlapping identities. The Niger Delta Liberation Front, for example, draws on an Ijaw ethnolinguistic and cultural base, while members of the Urhobo community make up its leadership.
This database was then matched with survey data from Afrobarometer, an independent pan-African research network. These surveys capture ethnic identity through respondents’ reported mother tongue. Sestito’s sample includes approximately 150,000 individuals belonging to 448 ethnolinguistic groups across 36 African countries. Social cohesion was measured through indicators such as participation in community meetings, involvement in local associations and engagement in collective action.
Violence and realisation
An initial finding suggests that these conflicts correspond less to conventional “wars” over regime change or territorial conquest than to diverse forms of violence. They include separatist movements, such as in the Niger Delta; Tuareg and Islamist rebellions in Mali; insurgencies in Kenya; and disputes between nomadic Fulani pastoralists and sedentary farming communities across West Africa and Nigeria. In the dataset, ethnic conflicts account for approximately 5 per cent of recorded events.
Sestito’s research suggests that when people experience ethnic violence, they feel more strongly attached to their identity and are more likely to cooperate with members of their own community. Once an ethnolinguistic group is caught up in violent confrontation, its members clearly feel a sense of belonging and pull together.
Other threats can trigger similar reactions, but the effect is much stronger when hostile behaviour stems from ethnic issues.
Increased sense of identity… even at a distance
To test these findings, Sestito demonstrated that the phenomenon persists even among those members of targeted ethnic groups that live far from conflict zones. In other words, strengthened identity cannot be explained solely by direct exposure to violence, wartime trauma or the collapse of local institutions. It also spreads through narratives, shared affiliations and the perception of collective threat.
The study further shows that the relationship between conflict and social cohesion weakens in more heterogeneous settings where multiple ethnolinguistic groups coexist. This suggests that increased cooperation remains largely confined to the targeted group itself.
By contrast, conflicts unrelated to respondents’ own ethnic group have no measurable effect on community engagement, highlighting the central role played by ethnic affiliation.
How cooperation spreads
Several mechanisms may explain these findings. Under conditions of insecurity, individuals often turn to their communities as sources of mutual support and collective protection.
Violence can lead these populations to organise local self-defence groups. Over time, the habits of cooperation thus built may spread beyond them and shape community life more broadly.
Conflict also leaves psychological scars: experiences of injustice can fuel resentment and strengthen people’s sense of solidarity with their own ethnic group.
“Us” against “them”
In his article, Sestito also draws on a socio-biological interpretation of ethnocentrism. Ethnic divisions can reactivate a stark, binary worldview – one that pits the in-group against out-groups – shaped by a combination of cultural, political, social and biological factors.
This framework helps explain not only hostility towards external groups, but also solidarity and cooperation within one’s own. These findings raise broader questions about how such dynamics can be mobilised politically in nationalist narratives, and they invite reflection on possible alternatives. If conflict breaks some social ties while strengthening others around a collective “us” defined against outsiders, how can communities build cohesion without hardening ethnic divisions?
- 1. 1. Coltan is a mineral composed of colombite and tantalite, used especially in capacitors for microelectronic devices (smartphones, computers, etc…) and in the aerospace industry.
- 2. 2. M. Sestito, “Identity conflict, ethnocentrism and social cohesion”, Journal of Development Economics, 2025: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103426
- 3. 3. Founded in 2005, this NGO collects and maps data on conflicts and political violence throughout the world: https://acleddata.com
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